"Lucky War"
and
Third Army in Desert Storm

Richard M. Swain



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

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TO THE SOLDIERS  OF THIRD ARMY

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Preface

There is a crossroads near Safwan in southeastern Iraq. Nearby, there is a small hill and an airstrip. After the Gulf War, Safwan became a gathering point for refugees fleeing the Iraqi Army as it reestablished control of Basrah. Prior to that, the airstrip was the site of the dictation of armistice terms to that army by the victorious coalition's military high command. Still earlier, at the end of the coalition attack, the absence of American forces on the airstrip and at the road junction was the source of the most serious command crisis of the U.S. expeditionary forces. Its resolution put at risk American soldiers and threatened the reputations of the very commanders who had just conducted the greatest offensive of concentrated armored forces in the history of the United States Army. In many ways, events at Safwan in late February and early March are emblematic of the Gulf War. It is to explain how U.S. forces arrived at Safwan, what they did and did not do there, and what this all meant, that this book is written.

The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort—good against evil, a wrong to be righted—a crusade.

It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991.

The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is

written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. Much evidence remains unavailable. The Army is very bad at collecting the documentary record of its activities in any sort of systematic way. It certainly is not expeditious about it. The principal actors are only beginning to tell their stories. General Schwarzkopf's account, flawed by much unsupported special pleading, remains to be answered by those he indicts. Moreover, we know very little of the enemy's intentions and the reasons and details surrounding Saddam Hussein's actions. Perhaps we may never know much more.

So in many ways this history, like all history, is necessarily imperfect. Yet it must be written to form a part of what shall eventually become the historic view of these events. This work also offers an accounting to the American people for the employment of their resources and the conscious imperiling of their sons and daughters in the cause of liberating Kuwait. It is hoped that it will also provide a useful institutional record that can be called upon in the future when policy makes similar demands upon the Army. Most important, this work reminds the reader that the decisions and actions that took place in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm occurred in a larger and quite specific context, one often beyond the influence of the people on the ground who so often were portrayed as able to control events and their own destinies far more than was the case. In the end, no completely free agents existed in Saudi Arabia. The story of this and all wars depends on how commanders adapted to circumstances as they found them and how they turned existing conditions to their benefit.

This book's focus is on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force *schwerpunkt*—General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." The book is titled "Lucky War" after the affectation of Third Army, whose telephone switch, as far back as General George Patton's World War II headquarters, has been named "Lucky." In the same fashion, the Third Army's tactical operations center in Desert Storm was referred to as "Lucky TOC." Its forward command post was "Lucky Wheels," and so on. "Lucky" is a talisman to Third Army as, incidentally, are "Jay Hawk" to VII Corps, and "Danger" to the 1st Infantry Division. It is for that reason alone that "Lucky" is incorporated in the title.

The author has made only limited use of oral interviews concerning tactical operations. Others in the field have more than adequately tapped the memories of participants at the ground level as well as in the high command. This work is based primarily on documentary evidence, clarified by interviews with participants, rather than the other way around.

This book does not presume to be an official history. The author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments and evaluations based upon available evidence. Thus, this is public history, written at public expense for public purposes: the education of Army officers and an accounting to the public of its Army in the operations in Southwest Asia as viewed from a military technical point of view.

The distinction between public and official history was laid down by Immanuel Kant almost two hundred years ago when he distinguished between the public and private use of reason. Kant allowed that those employed in the government's business might often be required to support the government's actions contrary to their own views. "One certainly must not argue," Kant says, "instead one must obey."[1] Such obedience is a hallmark of military discipline, particularly during a war.

Yet the Army has an institutional need for honesty and frankness in order to learn from its experiences. This requires not just a recording of events and actions but a critique that sets decisions and actions in context and evaluates them in light of available alternatives. Kant pointed out that, notwithstanding their official status, officials did not cease to surrender their membership in the wider community. He argued that in this broader persona, the official might address the public "in the role of the scholar . . . , without harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible."[2] One of Kant's examples of someone divided in personal responsibility, interestingly enough, was a soldier, who, he noted, must obey any order he receives. "But as a scholar," Kant maintains, "he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment."[3] This spirit animates this book.

This work was written against a deadline—or what the Army calls a "suspense." That constraint imposed limits on mastering even the incomplete materials available. But while this limitation will offend historical purists, haste was both necessary and justifiable. It was necessary because the information is perishable. Sometimes by the time an entirely "scientific history" is written, the practical need

for it may be past. One is reminded that the Israeli Army's history of its 1967 war was not in the hands of that army when the 1973 war broke out. But facts alone are not the only interest of historians, who deal in interpretations of evidence that are, to a degree, merely approximations or imperfect representations of past reality. The reader can judge whether or not the evidence cited here is adequate to support the conclusions drawn.

In his magisterial work *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Raymond Aron chose three lines of inquiry—theoretical, sociological, and historical—as a way of understanding international relations. This book will attempt to take the same approach, though perhaps applying Aron's method in different proportions. This work is first of all a history, a narrative account disciplined by evidence. But war is essentially a social activity, not only because it occurs within political societies but because armies are themselves social organizations. To understand why and how decisions were made and actions were taken, one must understand the social milieu in which the actors existed. The story that follows does not ignore interpersonal relations in telling what really happened, for the history of the war would be distorted by the omission of discussion of this very human problem. That would be wrong indeed. As for theory, it will be used from time to time for its explanatory value.

Some judgments are necessary on the performance of the leaders who directed the successful effort to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. This is done not from any mean-spirited belief that the author himself could have done it better had he the opportunity. There is a wide difference between knowing and doing, and commanders depend far more on the latter than the former. Clausewitz pointed out years ago that flanking maneuvers and concentration and maintenance of aim are not complex ideas, but their achievement is very difficult, indeed. ". . . let a general try to imitate Frederick!" he wrote, and that requires great reserves of "boldness, resolution and strength of will."[4]

One prejudice and two criteria undergird the judgments found in this book. The prejudice is simple: that killing in war is a means to an end, not an end in itself. What distinguishes the U.S. Army from many others is its recognition that there is a point, defined by diminishing utility to attainment of the goal sought, where simply killing the enemy ceases to be acceptable. Though one could not claim that this prejudice is a universal value in the Army, the capstone document for American armed forces doctrine, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1,

Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, carries with it a categorical imperative and a warning that seems to underscore the point:

> We also must have the courage to wield military power in a scrupulously moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience. This behavior is integral to our status as American fighting men and women. Acting with conscience reinforces the links among the Services and between the U.S. Armed forces and the American people, and these linkages are basic sources of our strength.[5]

The repeated willingness of American soldiers to comfort their captured adversaries in the field and the concern of the entire chain of command to avoid unnecessary loss of life or destruction would seem to indicate that this view of moral conduct is widespread in the U.S. Army.

One of my criteria for judgment came from the vice chief of staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, on a trip to Saudi Arabia shortly after the war. Sullivan spoke to a Third Army staff, perhaps too full of themselves after their still recent success, and he took any tendency for swagger out of them with a simple observation. "The American people," he said, "expect only one thing from us: That we will win! What you have done is no more than they expect. You have won." We must now ask, therefore, whether the actions in question contributed to the ultimate success of the war. And to this, I would add, whether the accomplishment of the goals set by the coalition and national political executive were *economical.*

The second criterion was set by General Schwarzkopf himself, and it has to do with character. As Schwarzkopf told television interviewer David Frost: "I admire men of character and I judge character not by how men deal with their superiors, but mostly how they deal with their subordinates. And that, to me, is where you find out what the character of the man is."[6] The author will leave judgments of character to the reader, but he will not ignore events that seem to reflect upon this aspect of the American high command. The U.S. Army claims to invest great effort in the development and evaluation of this human attribute. To ignore its influence would be to suppress a vital part of the story of Operation Desert Storm.

Finally, a number of themes are evident in the account of Third Army's part in the Gulf War. The first is the success of the U.S. Central Command in anticipating the contingency that occurred. When Iraq occupied Kuwait, Central Command had planned for just

such a contingency and was, therefore, able to respond much more promptly than would have been possible otherwise.

Central Command's anticipation notwithstanding, the threat posed by Iraq was not the one the U.S. Army of 1990 had been fashioned to meet. The Army had been organized, trained, and equipped to meet a Soviet invasion of Europe. A number of consequences for the Gulf War grew out of that salient fact. The Army and, indeed, the entire military panoply were equipped with the finest fighting equipment in the world. It lacked, however, the means for offensive operational maneuver because the European mission did not require them. Further, the Army had no doctrine and only a skeletal organization for echelons of command above the corps, like Third Army. The mobilization of an army-level headquarters and support structure had to be effected as events unfolded. How this was done is the second major theme of this book, and the story contains lessons about force building and deployment that should be useful for an Army that must increasingly respond to global contingencies in distant locales.

A third theme has to do with the corporate nature of the operational planning for Operation Desert Storm. Military doctrine and most historical accounts would suggest that military operations normally take place in response to a sequential and hierarchical planning sequence—from top to bottom. In Desert Storm, the process was multilevel, interactive, and simultaneous—as well as horizontal and vertical. The story of how the plan took form over a period of months and the assumptions that fashioned and shaped it in the theater of war are a central part of the story told in these pages.

The central role of logistics in operational war fighting, the power of personality in war, the unchanging features of war—friction, chance, and contingency—all are subordinate themes in the story of Third Army in Operation Desert Storm. The practice of command itself, the ability of a leader to make decisions and cause other men to both understand and obey him—in short, the role of the commander at the theater, operational, and tactical levels of war in an era of global tactical satellite communications—is the ultimate theme of this account. At the end of the day, it is the author's hope that the story told here will not be totally unfamiliar to those named in these pages.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment," in Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 42–43.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984), 179–80.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, 11 November 1991, 9.

6. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, quoted in transcript ". . . talking with David Frost," 22 March 1991, 28. Transcript in possession of the author.

Acknowledgments

During the Gulf War, I had the matchless opportunity to be assigned as theater army historian on the staff of the Third Army in Saudi Arabia. Though one would not necessarily draw such a conclusion from most published accounts of the Gulf War, Third Army was the senior operational headquarters of the United States Army in the Persian Gulf. Third Army was commanded by Lieutenant General John Yeosock, who was on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from the start. Indeed, the Desert Storm army was largely his creation. But Yeosock had earlier served in an Army whose attitudes had been formed over the years by NATO scenarios in which the largest national formation was to be a corps. The U.S. Army had not foreseen a requirement to deploy a multicorps army. The interposition of an army headquarters between the corps and the theater commander was not without difficulties and gave rise to a certain cognitive dissonance at times. Yeosock himself is a man who shies from public exposure and who does not do particularly well before the camera. Criticism of the conduct of the war has tended to ignore the intervening headquarters between the two Army corps commanders and the very visible commander in chief, H. ("Stormin'") Norman Schwarzkopf. This picture is very wrong, and among other reasons, it is to correct this impression that this account is written.

This book would never have been completed without the material assistance of a number of people to whom the author owes a considerable debt. First, there is Bill Stacy, the historian of U.S. Army Forces Command, who made it possible for the author to go to Saudi Arabia as Third Army historian. Bill also has been a source of assistance and encouragement since then. He is everything an Army historian must be and so few are. His principal assistant, Mrs. Tammy C. Howle, must also be acknowledged for her assistance while the author was assigned to Fort McPherson, Georgia. I should also express appreciation to Lieutenant General Leonard Wishart, commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and then-Brigadier General John Miller, the deputy commandant in 1990–91, for permitting me to go.

The commander and staff officers of Third Army made it possible for me to watch much of what took place and to collect the documents necessary to write this account. The army staff officers, busy with the conduct of the war, accepted the historian as a fellow professional, even though they often failed to understand why the headquarters needed a historian. Nonetheless, they always took the time to answer

questions and to explain why various perceptions might be incomplete. Lieutenant Colonels Dave Mock, Mike Kendall, and the G3 planners were particularly helpful and supportive. The 44th Military History Detachment, commanded by Major Larry Heysteck, laid the foundation for the army history office, and Sergeant Bonnie Gray and Major Guy Sanderson helped run it. All were enthusiastic and great professionals, and the successes I enjoyed in Saudi Arabia are largely due to their efforts. The chief of military history, Brigadier General Hal Nelson, provided me with the opportunity to spend a year researching the records and writing the first draft of this account, sometimes in the face of opposition from his organization. Hal provided me with the time and resources to set up a research office in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth. There, I was assisted by three great confederates who, in truth, did most of the hard work. These were Dr. Pat Swann and Captains Russel Santala and Mark Traylor. Without them, nothing would have been accomplished. Pat is a geographer whom the Staff College could not figure out how to employ properly. She has now left the college for other government work. Russ Santala and Mark Traylor, both exceptionally gifted officers and veterans of the war, were invaluable in tracking down records, finding evidence, and criticizing the author's flights of fancy. Mrs. Elaine Hoinacki, the team typist, spent many long days listening to recorded interviews and transcribed faithfully all that was intelligible therein. Thanks are also owed the librarians of CARL's third floor, who made room and welcomed three intruders and their various file cabinets and safes into an already overcrowded attic.

I enjoyed the advice, too, of an excellent board of editors: Dr. Pete Maslowski, Dr. Larry Yates, Colonels Jim McDonough and Greg Fontinot, Major Mark Blum, and Don Gilmore. Professor Edward M. ("Mac") Coffman also read the draft and provided wise counsel. Their advice was always thoughtful, and I followed most of it. I likely should have followed it all, but old colonels are fixed in their views. The errors that remain are, thus, entirely my own. Mrs. Sharon Torres, my secretary and administrative assistant during my years in the Combat Studies Institute at CGSC, has been a great help, particularly in mediating between my Luddite ignorance and the world of computers and word processors. I also wish to thank D. M. Giangreco, design editor of the *Military Review*, and Byron G. McCary, visual information specialist at the Training Support Center (TSC), for their generous offer of photos to be used in this work. I am also indebted to Edward J. Carr and Robin Inojos, visual information specialists, and Alfred Dulin, graphics supervisor, for their coordination and layout of the manuscript. In addition, Carolyn D. Conway, editorial assistant,

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Finally, this book would have died in the hold box of the Center of Military History (CMH) but for the determination of the George C. Marshall Professor of Military History at CGSC, Dr. Roger Spiller, that it be published. Dr. Spiller recovered it from CMH, set up an editorial board, and encouraged, prodded, and otherwise motivated the author to take it up again and push it through to completion. Spiller has been chief editor and principal source of energy for seeing the project through to publication. Whatever errors remain are simply indications that no editor can do everything to correct the accumulated flaws of an author. Roger Spiller has been my intellectual mentor for seven years, and I owe him a great debt. That I am all too aware of the price he has paid, in terms of much time he might otherwise have turned to far more valuable projects of his own, only increases my sense of obligation.

Introduction

For a description of the human and material wreckage left in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Richard Swain reaches back to the classical world. It was, he writes, " 'a hecatomb'—a gruesome sacrifice of hapless victims on a terrifying scale, meant to propitiate the ancient gods."[1]

Hapless, note, not helpless. Saddam Hussein's soldiers did not begin their war meaning to be victims. That role was meant for the people of Kuwait. Saddam's soldiers were made that way by their own leaders and by the combined forces of an international military expedition.

But the outcome of this war was not inevitable. The human and mechanical scale of the war, its geographical scope, its technical complexities, and its highly lethal effects posed choices for all the combatants that only rarely were self-evident or obvious. If the allied victory was not foreordained, neither was the process by which that victory was achieved. That depended upon a war fought as professionally and precisely as possible, with as strict attention to military and technical detail as the allies could muster. How this professional and technical process unfolded, as it was viewed from the United States Third Army headquarters and in the military formations whose operations that headquarters controlled, is the subject of Richard Swain's book, "*Lucky War.*"

History may never be able to learn just why Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990. Seeing only a future that he preferred to see, Saddam may have been encouraged by the West's compliant policies toward Iraq during its long war with Iran. Perhaps he believed he had stored up credits of favor with the West by spending so much in that war. Or he may have misled himself with a spurious view of Iraq's brief national history; once in possession of Kuwait, supposedly a former Iraqi province, he may have planned to create a new pan-Islamic union in the region. Or, perhaps, there was only the oil: emboldened by the prospect of controlling a major part of the world's supply, he may have convinced himself that the rest of the world would countenance his fait accompli.[2]

But for any or all of Saddam's imaginings to yield success, it was imperative that he be allowed to keep what he had taken. This, he was not allowed to do. Once in Kuwait, Saddam's army could not leave, and the United Nations could not leave it there.

Modern military history records few examples of such a grossly miscalculated adventure as this one. It was a gamble, foolishly taken, badly played from the outset. The revolution in the Soviet Union had relaxed superpower tensions, but not so much that Western armies had irrevocably demobilized. Large, highly trained, and well-equipped standing armies were still in place in Europe and America and not lately used. If he thought about such matters at all, Saddam may have believed that, after so many years of cold war, the major powers would not so soon recommit themselves to a serious military enterprise.

In this, as in so much else, Saddam was mistaken. As a superpower and leader of the free world during the cold war, the United States looked forward to exercising its leadership in an atmosphere free of long-standing international antagonisms. The invasion of Kuwait challenged America's still optimistic ambitions for a post-cold war peace, a "new world order." When President Bush announced, shortly after the invasion, "This will not stand," his fervor seemed to arise at least partly from disappointment that there would be no respite from the demands of international leadership. The president's announcement marked the effective beginning of the Persian Gulf War.

As we now know, the president's decision was all his.[3] Some months were to pass, however, before the true dimensions of the military commitment by the United States and its allies would reveal themselves, and that was chiefly the business of the military professionals and the military policy makers. As Swain shows here, that business was marked by decisions taken, as usual, in an ambiguous and contingent atmosphere: the allied effort looked far different in late October than a month later, when it was finally agreed that only a military offensive against occupying Iraqi forces would suffice to meet the policy objectives set forth in United Nations Resolution 678.

Although some military pedants still dream of planning and conducting a war immune from the intrusions of policy, the course of military planning from Operation Desert Shield to the execution of Operation Desert Storm that Swain describes was a thoroughly modern war, bounded on all sides and shaped daily by the demands of policy. In recent years, presidents and their commanders have indulged in the conceit that they have not gotten in each other's way, but the history of recent military operations tells a different story entirely. Nearly instantaneous global and public telecommunications make certain that modern wars can no longer be fought as though they are quarantined from public view. Analysts now use the term

"crisis transparency" to describe a diplomatic environment in which statesmen communicate with one another more by public than official means.[4] The effects of these technical advancements meant that policy could reach deeply into the allies' military machinery, affecting time-honored professional habits and behavior. When a field commander can tune in to his commander in chief's latest news conference, and then watch as his immediate superiors translate that news into military intent, we can see that, while the game may be the same in its essentials, the playing field has been dramatically changed.[5] If it has ever been so, it is no longer so that policy falls silent when the first guns are fired. It was not so in the Persian Gulf War.

The success of coalition-making in war depends upon all parties finding agreement on the war's purposes, shapes, and ends. The sturdiest coalition is one that does not bind its members too tightly to precise objectives that may be dear to one party but not to another. What is more important is that all parties to a coalition can agree in like measure and commitment, even if the resources each invests are disproportionate. These principles were followed in this war, and they manifested themselves as limitations on national operations.

For the Americans, this meant that there would be no overt campaign to dethrone Saddam, although, perhaps, accidents of war would not have been unwelcome. This meant, further, that no ground forces would cross the Euphrates River and make for Baghdad. The air war did not suffer this particular constraint, but allied airmen worked under their own unique limitations all the same. No terror bombings this time; no Dresdens or Tokyos were ever in the offing.

Those limitations extended not only to actions against the enemy but to the way in which allied operations were framed and conducted. Allied military objectives were to be met by commanders who husbanded the lives of their soldiers more strictly than in any other major conflict. And as the time drew closer for the ground offensive to begin, these commanders subordinated their operational plans and established tactical measures of control to prevent casualties from "friendly fire." One brigade commander has been frank to admit that the threat of friendly fire in tactical zones dense with soldiers and weapons, not the enemy, governed his tactical dispositions, and higher-ranking officers have not been reluctant to express the depth of their concern over this age-old problem of military operations.

These concerns, it must be said, did not arise so much from high-minded humanitarianism. American commanders were willing to surrender certain tactical advantages because of the possibility that

casualties by misadventure might somehow erode popular confidence back home. Indeed, a curious agreement existed on this issue between Saddam and the commanders who fought against him. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as the undersecretary of defense for policy during the war, has written that Saddam "seemed to have concluded, from observing both the Vietnam war and the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut, that the United States lacked staying power . . . ."[6] The human costs of the coming war on the ground, whether by friendly or enemy fire, posed a dramatic and unresolved question that, for the Americans especially, reached back to those earlier conflicts.

From the president downward through the chain of command, the ghost of the Vietnam War hovered over every proceeding.[7] All that was necessary to ignite calls for U.S. withdrawal, Saddam seemed to have thought, was the prospect of high casualties, and these he bluntly forecasted on several occasions. If Saddam had been watching carefully, however, he would have seen that the tempo and pace of the allied build-up showed no signs of slacking, even after American casualty forecasts as high as 30,000 were made in public.[8] No evidence has yet come to light suggesting that casualty projections impeded the operations of the allied expedition in any way.

All of which is not to say that these anxieties had no effect on official views or behavior. Instead of shrinking from the prospect of the war, those anxieties seem to have moved the Americans in precisely the opposite way, toward an unstinting commitment of force of arms. Policy might dictate operational limitations, but there were to be no half-measures. Having himself thoroughly imbibed the "lessons" of Vietnam, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, told the Saudi Prince Bandar in the early days of the crisis, "If we have to [fight], I'll do it, but we're going to do it with everything we have."[9]

In this sense, the Persian Gulf War was to be a redemptive war: commanders were intent on avoiding what they regarded as the mistakes of the past. Quite apart from immediate policy objectives, this war had institutional goals as well: it would be fought so as to reclaim for the U.S. Army preeminence in the world of professional soldiering. The actions of the American commanders suggested that they were not about to design another war so susceptible to the uncertainties of an American national will they viewed as fragile. They would design a war that would not, insofar as possible, again test the strength of that will. This war was to be planned from the outset as a short, violent, massive, and decisive victory whose conduct capitalized upon material abundance and professional and

technological acumen as the means of reducing the human costs of the war. This war would be everything the Vietnam War had not been. And when the war was over, it would be the president himself who framed its larger significance. The victory celebrations were an opportunity for the nation to "kick the Vietnam syndrome" by affording returning troops a proper welcome of thanks.[10]

Within the shifting context of domestic experience and reaction, international diplomacy and strategy, there remained the fact of the war itself: the necessity that armed force was required to decide the issues at hand. The distance between conceiving and executing this decision entailed the mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and direction of a huge multinational force toward politically and militarily achievable goals thousands of miles from its points of origin.

The result, as we now know, was by no means the "near-run thing" so dear to the hearts of military romantics. It was a victory as complete as was wanted or could reasonably be had. In its fundamental character, it was a thoroughly American kind of war. Russell Weigley, the dean of American military historians, has written of the "American way of war," a national style of warfare, defined by its attritional impulse even in those instances when a more strictly modulated application of violence may have been more appropriate.[11] Erstwhile strategists will find no exquisite, stylish innovations in this conflict. Perhaps the most arresting, and telling, of Richard Swain's images in the pages that follow is his depiction of the coalition's ground attack as that of a "drill bit," boring remorselessly into a rock face. In its design, in its conduct, and perhaps even in it ending, the Persian Gulf War bore an unmistakably American stamp.

If materiel could be made to fight this war, then materiel could win it by sheer mountainous weight. The character of the American side of the war was, as Swain's metaphor suggests, relentlessly industrial. The humblest subjects—ones that do not ordinarily arrest the attention of strategists, "operational artists," or even tacticians—played critical parts in the war's design. That design required above all moving what amounted to a small city thousands of miles around the world and keeping it in good running order until the time came to close the assembly line and shut down the factory once more. No shortages of soldiers beset the generals, and because the work of most soldiers in this war had to do with the servicing of machines in one way or another, the older problem of numbers in war was replaced by one of distribution. Witness Swain's discussion of HETs, the heavy equipment transporters whose shortage occupied the time and energy of the Third Army's commanding general as did few other subjects.

HETs, how many available, where and when, the strength and state of their crews—indeed, where to get more? These were questions of substance, the assembling and organizing of assets, that called upon the true métier of the Americans—organization.

And organized the war certainly was, so thoroughly organized that the actual fighting seemed almost anticlimactic—except, of course as always, for those who actually had to fight. At one point, the force-to-space ratio very nearly squeezed an entire division between two others. No adroit maneuvering permitted or desired here: any dispersion or movements that would have elicited sighs of approval from the audience would have dissipated the concentrated power of the attack that had been planned from the beginning.

The Persian Gulf War was a professionals' war, and so Swain's book is by and large a professionals' book. "*Lucky War*" was conceived and written for military officers and other serious students of the military art. It is particularly meant to illuminate and explain the technical complexities of the war, matters that general war literature so often takes for granted or merely ignores. As an operational history of the war, it does not neglect to show how even the finest details of military planning and violent execution are subjected to the dynamic interactions of an event with so many moving parts. It is written from the vantage point of the U.S. Third Army, the headquarters placed between the fighting corps and the unified command of the war. From this vantage point, a clear view of both the highest and lowliest aspects of the war was available. From this position, Swain scouted in all directions for the sources of this history, from briefing rooms in Riyadh to the front-line traces. "*Lucky War*" is thus a book by both an informed observer and a participant.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Richard Swain was a colonel, serving on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as the director of the Combat Studies Institute. A graduate of West Point, a field artillery officer, and veteran of Vietnam, Swain had also won a doctorate in history from Duke University. Between command and staff assignments, he had taught at West Point and at the Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies. Along the way, he had made of himself one of the Army's most disciplined and productive students of the history of the military art.

Shortly after the invasion, Swain was asked for a forecast of the strategic end state of the crisis, whose barest outlines were only beginning to be revealed. He was not confident that the United States would intervene militarily, and he hoped that economic sanctions

would resolve the trouble. But as the crisis grew more serious, Swain was quick to see that the U.S. Army was on the verge of another limited war, and one of significant proportions. A historic event of some magnitude was in the making. As the Army mobilized for the conflict, Swain was convinced that history should mobilize with it.

Armies preparing for war are rarely if ever sympathetic to the presence of historians. Historians and their work have to do with matters that seem remote to commanders and staff officers consumed by events at hand. The work of history seems all too easily postponed. Once the war is concluded, however, the reverse seems to be true. Armies at once become interested in commemorating and celebrating their victories, if indeed a victory has been recorded. They want to know, too, what lessons may be learned from their recent experience, the theory being that those lessons might be applied in future operations. In practice, however, these efforts seldom produce insights that alter professional behavior. Soon enough, armies revert to the routines of the garrison.

Swain was fully aware of these problems. He knew that armies in the past had paid for ignoring their own experience. He knew as well that commemorating an experience was no substitute for understanding it. And he knew that the discipline and patience demanded by close historical study would not permit the instant production of a book. If the war was serious enough to be fought, he believed, its history deserved a serious and deliberate effort.

Finally, Swain was moved by concerns that transcended his professional interest in the war and its history. As an *American* soldier, Swain believed that his nation deserved an accounting of its army's performance, that his fellow citizens had a right to demand a means of understanding how the energy of their sons and daughters and the fruits of their labors had been spent in a war that had been fought in their interests. Swain meant his history as a contribution to that understanding.

In late November 1991, Swain was finally notified of his appointment as the theater army historian. He was ordered to deploy to Third Army headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, there to oversee the operations of several official military history detachments then operating with major unit formations and to record and eventually to write the history of the war. He arrived in Saudi Arabia in January 1991, just before the beginning of the ground offensive. He returned to the United States in May and for the next two years continued his research and writing.

"*Lucky War*" is Swain's fulfillment of his assignment. It is "official military history," a variety of history that the British military historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, once condemned as a contradiction in terms. Jaundiced by his relations with the British Army's official historians from World War I, Liddell Hart denied that serving officers, or anyone with intimate official relations, could produce a military history that a reader might approach with confidence. The shadow of Liddell Hart's opinion has darkened official history for decades. Swain was guided in his own research and writing by the ambition to prove Liddell Hart wrong once again. This, he has done in full measure.

ROGER J. SPILLER
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Notes

1. See, for instance, Michael Kelly's description of the "highway of death" in Martyrs' Day: Chronicle of a Small War (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 233–44.

2. For a discussion of the effect of modern telecommunications upon crisis diplomacy, see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), xxxiii–xxxiv, 78, 260.

3. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 260.

4. See Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 42–50.

5. For all the complications inherent in the technical improvements in global public communications, an equally complex set of problems inheres in modern military communications. One indicator of the scope of these problems combined can be found in what might be called the "electronic history" of the Persian Gulf War, where public communications consumed twice as much communications satellite band width reporting the war as the military did in fighting it. See Alan D. Campen, "Information, Truth and War," in The First Information War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992), 87.

6. Paul Wolfowitz, "Victory Came Too Easily," The National Interest, n. 35 (Spring 1994): 91.

7. The ghost warned against the dangers of confused national purpose, the corrosive effects of military gradualism upon popular support for a limited war, and of surrendering initiative to the enemy. Above all, the ghost insisted upon the prompt achievement of decisive victory by virtue of highly concentrated, overwhelming force. These precepts had already been codified by Caspar Weinberger while secretary of defense. The so-called Weinberger Doctrine set conditions for the employment of American force in future expeditions. Notwithstanding the dubious constitutionality of the exercise—American armed forces are instruments, not arbiters, of policy—the doctrine did resonate within the defense establishment: it conformed wonderfully to dearly held prejudices about the use of American military power that had been formed since the Vietnam War. See Caspar Weinberger's Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 400–402 and 433–45, for the secretary's discussion of the context in which his ideas were conceived, as well as the text of his speech before the National Press Club in which he first publicly enunciated his doctrine.

8. See James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 106–7.

9. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 324.

10. President George Bush, "Remarks at a Meeting of Veterans Service Organizations," 4 March 1991, reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, nos. 1–14 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 248. Virtually every serious study of the Persian Gulf War employs the Vietnam War as an invidious comparison. Indeed, the story of the U.S. Army's recovery from defeat in Vietnam

forms the theme of the opening chapter in the Army's own first attempt to capture the history of the Persian Gulf War. See Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., Certain Victory: *The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 1993), 1–38.

11. See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ix–xv and passim, for a complete exposition of this idea.

1

Prologue to Operation Desert Shield

In the first two months of 1991, the armed forces of an unprecedented global coalition attacked and destroyed the core of Iraq's military forces, thus freeing the small but oil-rich state of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Although the United States contributed almost half the friendly military forces engaged, the coalition based its international authority on a large majority vote of the United Nations Security Council.[1] Military contributions came from thirty-seven separate states and financial and material donations from others.[2] The regional legitimacy conferred on the endeavor by the U.S. partnership with the Saudi government and the participation, under Saudi sponsorship, of other Gulf States and major Arab powers was equally important.

Because the Gulf War was a coalition war, it remained a war of limited objectives. At no time was the destruction of Iraq a serious consideration. The strategists seem always to have had a keen eye on what the postwar regional balance of power would look like, not wishing to exchange one destabilizing imbalance for another.

The war occurred in a "new world" context. The old post-World War II framework of Soviet-American confrontation had been supplanted by a multipolar global community. Within this new global political environment, former members of the Warsaw Pact contributed contingents and materiel to serve in a variety of symbolic ways.

The fundamental causes of this war reach back a thousand years or more to the birth of Islam and its spread throughout the world. Certainly they extend to the breakup of the last great Islamic empire at the end of World War I. And they include the stresses operating since that time throughout the developing world as traditional societies have coped with the twin pressures of modernization and competing foreign (Western) ideologies. These causes, however, are largely beyond the scope of this study. Iraq's violation of the sovereignty of a weak brother Arab state was the sufficient cause of the 1990–91 Gulf War. This action alone—which threatened Saudi Arabia, the minor Gulf States, and the regional and global economic balance of power—called the anti-Iraq coalition into existence. With the collapse of the old world order, a clear precedent was called for in the form of united military action that would punish this wanton act

by a mighty nation against a weak one and place it beyond the pale of legitimate international behavior. These are the circumstances that led to war.

Since World War II, the United States Department of Defense has divided the world into a number of geographic regions. Joint service military headquarters have been assigned responsibility for these regions, and they are responsible for conducting necessary military operations and forestalling trouble. Following the fiasco of Operation Desert One, the aborted attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in revolutionary Iran, a new theater, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), was carved out in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and eastern Indian Ocean area. CENTCOM's headquarters were located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The commander in chief of CENTCOM in 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, directed all U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. His headquarters and those of his subordinate service components, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, actually began to prepare for hostilities with Iraq long before fighting broke out.

Army units participated in the operations in Southwest Asia as part of a joint military response to Iraqi aggression. The contributions of other U.S. military services were at least as vital to the outcome as those of the Army. Each service contributed its own unique capabilities. Indeed, the Air Force can claim, with some justification, to have been the predominant service in this desert war. While this book will focus on the Army's contribution—particularly those of Third Army, its two assigned corps, and support command—the Army was but one service among five (counting the Coast Guard) in a coalition in which the armed services of many nations contributed to the final outcome, each in accordance with its own capabilities.

The military actions of August 1990 to January 1991 (Operation Desert Shield) and those of January and February 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) were only a part of the strategic response by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their coalition allies to the Iraqi aggression. The total effort against Iraq combined economic, political, and military instruments of interstate power. Establishing the necessary political framework for military action often set the pace at which military preparations could be made. Many opportunities were available for any of the parties to have gone another way—except, perhaps, the government-in-exile of Kuwait. None of what actually happened was preordained.

Only the choices of the various players led to the resolution that came to pass. For many weeks, it appeared that a military standoff of undetermined duration had developed and that, behind the scenes, economic and political forces would have to be given time to impose a resolution. Only that prospect accounts for the discussion concerning transition of Third Army from a contingency headquarters to the status of a more permanent major army command and the simultaneous planning for the rotation of ground forces in and out of theater. These discussions went on in the fall of 1990 even as planning went forward for possible offensive actions in Southwest Asia.[3] Each succeeding step toward war was contingent on earlier measures, and nothing was very certain—except the determination of Saddam Hussein to remain in Kuwait and the equal determination of the coalition to have him out, one way or the other.

President George Bush did not announce development of an offensive military option until 8 November. Not until early January did the United States Congress—and not by an overwhelming mandate—follow the United Nations Security Council in authorizing the use of military force to break the deadlock in the desert.[4] The importance of the president's political strategy to the final outcome cannot be overstated, nor the skill with which he and his secretary of state, James Baker, orchestrated their actions. The secretary of state's ability to challenge the United States Senate on 5 December 1990—to demonstrate the same resolve already shown by the United Nations Security Council on 29 November—is indicative of the Bush administration's political skill.[5]

Finally, it is vitally important to understand that the ability to complete various military actions during the war's offensive phase, Desert Storm, was contingent on the need to compensate for earlier decisions made in response to a quite different set of assigned tasks and assumptions in effect during the earlier protective (defensive) phase, Operation Desert Shield. Decisions taken for good reasons in August and September, both at the political and theater level, had significant implications for how business could be done in December and January, as military forces in Saudi Arabia prepared for an offensive. Simply put, a force built for attack has different communications, logistics, intelligence, and force structure requirements than one created for deterrence and defense and under political guidance to deploy only "minimum essential forces." Over and above all these short-term influences lay another reality: the armed forces committed to the Arabian Peninsula had been designed and structured originally for a very different war—a forward defense of

NATO on the Central Front in Europe. This accounts for such anomalies as the Army's shortage of line-haul trucks, particularly heavy equipment transporters (HETs), the large flat-bed trucks used to transport heavy armored vehicles to the front.[6]

Strictly speaking, Operation Desert Shield began on C-day, 7 August 1990, when the president ordered U.S. military forces to the Arabian Peninsula to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from the threat of Iraqi aggression following Saddam Hussein's 2 August (0140Z) invasion of Kuwait.[7] (See map 1.) In fact, the operation was anticipated by several months of Central Command planning actions that placed Army forces, particularly Third Army and XVIII Airborne Corps, in an especially favorable position for the accomplishment of their assigned missions. Any account of this operation, then, must start by considering events that began in November 1989, when some critics considered Iraqi aggression against Kuwait scarcely creditable.

In the fall of 1989, the postwar global power structure had broken down. The Soviet Union was undergoing dramatic internal stresses, while its European empire was falling away rapidly. As Soviet interest turned inward, military planners everywhere responded by considering the emerging multipolar world as the strategic environment of the 1990s. U.S. estimates examined the restructuring of the American military in light of new threat assessments.

For Central Command, that meant shifting its focus from opposing a Soviet attack through Iran, the principal threat envisioned from 1983 to 1989, to a more regional threat, a hypothetical Iraqi attack against its weak but oil rich neighbors to the south. In November 1989, General Schwarzkopf directed that the theater operations plan that addressed an Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia (Operations Plan [OPLAN] 1002-90) be made the priority for Central Command planning and that the plan be revised as quickly as possible.[8] In December, Schwarzkopf requested and was granted permission to shift the focus of a forthcoming Joint Chiefs of Staff war game from the disappearing Soviet threat (OPLAN 1021) to the defense of the Arabian Peninsula. In January 1990, Central Command called for the preparation of war plans against an Iraqi threat to the Arabian Peninsula. These were to be the basis of the exercise, Internal Look, scheduled for July 1990.[9]

Baghdad emerged from its eight-year war with Iran still strong enough to attack Saudi Arabia. Indeed, while recommending that the United States "continue to develop its contacts with Iraq by building selectively on existing political and economic relationships," General

Map 1. Saudi Arabia

Schwarzkopf told the Senate Armed Forces Committee in January 1990 that "Iraq is now the preeminent military power in the Gulf, and It is assuming a broader leadership role throughout the Arab world. Iraq has the capability to militarily coerce its neighboring states should diplomatic efforts fail to produce the desired results."[10] Critics of this view argued that Iraq lacked the intent or economic capability to move against its neighbors. Some suggested the CENTCOM analysis was no more than an attempt to justify the command's existence.[11]

As Saddam Hussein increased tensions in the region throughout the spring, U.S. assistance to Iraq (which dated back to the Iran-Iraq War) would become a political issue. In April, CENTCOM planners were directed to drop the country's identifications in their planning

documents and to substitute the less politically sensitive color codes of RED (Iraq), ORANGE (Iran), and YELLOW (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).[12]

Third Army, as the Central Command's Army component, was also reevaluating the regional threat. The principal Army war plan in the fall of 1989 assumed a Soviet attack through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The plan called for five and two-thirds U.S. divisions in the defense, mostly light and heavy forces at something less than full strength (apportioned to it by the Joint Strategic Capability Plan [JSCAP]). Less than two divisions were apportioned to the separate plan then in place for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula.[13]

Even before Schwarzkopf changed Central Command's planning priorities, ARCENT began adjusting to the idea that Iraq constituted the major regional threat. Third Army also held that any U.S. response to the potential danger would require a significantly larger and heavier force than had been anticipated. As early as March 1989, Third Army began to coordinate with the Army Concepts and Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a war game simulation of the existing war plan for the Arabian Peninsula to examine this hypothesis.

CAA ran Wargame Persian Tiger 89 in February 1990, as planning for a revised defensive concept got under way. Persian Tiger posited a defensive force of three Army light brigades (one airborne, two airmobile), a battalion of the Ranger regiment, an air defense artillery brigade, corps aviation, and artillery. Two Marine expeditionary brigades and aviation forces allocated under the existing plan were also portrayed. The findings of the game, which began to emerge in February but which were not published until August 1990, were that U.S. forces could not arrive in theater in time to resist an Iraqi invasion if deployment were ordered only upon outbreak of hostilities. It was learned also that the allocated U.S. force structure was too light to do what was required of it, in any event.[14]

By the time the results of Persian Tiger were published, Central Command's own planners had arrived at many of the same conclusions. The exercise provided a mechanism that supported ongoing Third Army planning in the spring of 1990 and offered an opportunity for Third Army and subordinate XVIII Corps planners to begin gaining practical experience in the problems they would actually face in August.

Between January and July 1990, Central Command, Third Army, and XVIII Corps planners prepared draft operation plans for the new

contingency, and in July, United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), the headquarters commanding all continental U.S. Army combat forces, began selecting units to meet Army Forces Central Command's requirements.[15] The deputy commanding general of Third Army, Major General William Riley, began visiting various headquarters with a briefing on Third Army's view of the changing regional threat.[16] Back at Fort McPherson, Georgia, Riley and the Third Army staff conducted a functional analysis of the forces required for the new plan. This was the first step toward development of Desert Shield time-phased force development data (TPFDD), a troop list to support the new plan.

A number of features of the draft Third Army plan (1002-90), published in July 1990, show how prewar planning guided Third Army's actions during Operation Desert Shield. The plan was intended to direct the Army's contribution to Central Command's broader-objective regional plan "designed to counter an intraregional conflict on the ARABIAN PENINSULA to protect UNITED STATES (U.S.) and allied access to ARABIAN PENINSULA oil."[17] Central Command's strategy for a regional contingency spelled out its strategy this way:

> The USCENTCOM regional contingency strategy to counter an intraregional threat initially seeks to [secure] U.S. and allied interests through deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy additional U.S. combat forces to assist friendly states in defending critical ports and oil facilities on the ARABIAN PENINSULA. Once sufficient combat power has been generated and the enemy has been sufficiently attrited, the strategy is to mass forces and conduct a counteroffensive to recapture critical port and oil facilities which may have been seized by enemy forces in earlier stages of conflict.

Notably, as a precondition of execution, the plan indicated that "the scope of operations requires that this plan be executed independently of other major contingencies."[18]

The plan portrayed an Iraqi attack through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia. The attack force consisted of sixty brigades, supported by 640 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and a minimum of 3,200 tanks. The plan assumed four days would be needed to take Kuwait and another five to reach the port of Al Jubayl. It credited Iraq with an operational reach no longer than Al Hufuf—enough grasp to occupy the main Persian Gulf ports and key oil facilities. The plan also assumed three to six months' increased regional tension and up to thirty days' strategic warning.

The corresponding Third Army plan assumed a deployment decision at least nineteen days prior to hostilities, an immediate 200,000-man selected Reserve call-up, and availability of assigned National Guard roundout brigades and necessary combat service support units.[19] In the pre-Desert Storm Army force structure, roundout brigades were National Guard formations that were expected to fill out incomplete Regular Army divisions and deploy with them to war. In the event, Third Army would enjoy neither the advanced warning nor have the benefit of an early selected Reserve call-up. The absence of both would influence significantly how Third Army went to war.

The Third Army plan was designed for the defense of critical port and oil facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl and Abqaiq, the operation of common-user seaports, and the provision of combat support and combat service support (logistics) to Central Command forces in theater.[20] The concept of operations called for a three-phase deployment.[21] Phase one addressed the introduction of "deterrent forces," the Third Army and XVIII Corps' forward headquarters, an aviation brigade task force, and troops from the 82d Airborne Division. These forces, along with Marine units, were to establish a deterrent force north of Al Jubayl to secure the points of debarkation at Jubayl, Ad Dammam, and Dhahran and, upon arrival of the Marines, to establish a defense of the Abqaiq oil facilities. The deterrent effect of ground forces would be greatly enhanced, of course, by the simultaneous arrival of air and naval forces. Indeed, in the first month of any deployment, the U.S. and Saudi air threat to extended Iraqi lines of communication *was* the deterrent.

Phase two of the Third Army deployment was to involve the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their reserve component "roundout" brigades, a brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (then undergoing deactivation), and the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Arrival of these heavier forces would permit the establishment of a defense in depth behind Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to the north along the Saudi border and forward of the ports and oil facilities. Should the enemy attack at this point, the Air Force component (principally Central Command Air Forces [CENTAF]) was assigned to contest the offensive. The Army aviation task force of attack helicopters would link the ground forces with the theater air interdiction program. The brigade of the 9th Division (Motorized) was to be held in theater reserve. Phase three called for a coordinated counteroffensive

involving Saudi, U.S. Army, and Marine forces to restore lost territory and facilities.[22]

In mid-July, Third Army and the other CENTCOM component planners went to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to test their plans in Exercise Internal Look.[23] Third Army's Internal Look concept of operations also called for a three-phased operation: building up a corps-sized force, defense of critical facilities, and a counteroffensive. Tactical command was to be the province of the commander, XVIII Airborne Corps. Third Army would assemble and sustain the force as the Army component of Central Command. A key assumption was that sustainment in an environment with no developed or prepositioned United States military forces would require maximum host-nation support to succeed. Country RED was portrayed as possessing significant armored forces (around 4,000 tanks), theater ballistic missiles, a strong air force, and a chemical and biological capability.[24]

Like the Third Army plan, the Internal Look scenario called for an Army force consisting of an attack helicopter brigade task force, the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (two brigades), the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the brigade from the 9th Division (Motorized), and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (two brigades). It also assumed the presence, late in the sequence of arriving units, of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)—both National Guard roundout brigades—to complete the 24th and 5th Divisions. This was a total of seven light brigades (three airborne, three air assault, one motorized) and seven heavy brigades. The scenario assumed prior warning. D-day, the date of attack, was C-day plus 18 (C-day is the date upon which the force would be ordered to deploy). This assumption, in turn, permitted a further assumption, perhaps more tenuous, of the presence in theater on D-day of the corps headquarters, the aviation brigade task force, the airborne division, the 11th Air Defense Brigade, elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and the ARCENT headquarters.[25]

The Marine Corps forces of Central Command were expected to land and move into a defensive sector along the coast protecting the port of Al Jubayl. Third Army was to defend inland, forward of Ad Dammam, Dhahran, and Abqaiq. The component boundary was located east of An Nuayriyah. The scenario, like the earlier plans, assumed participation of Gulf Cooperation Council members and Royal Saudi Land Forces in their own defense.

During planning, it had become clear to Third Army staff officers that their force was inadequate. The Third Army commander, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, used Exercise Internal Look as an opportunity to make a case with General Schwarzkopf that additional heavy forces and Patriot air defense systems were required to execute the assigned missions. Third Army believed that, although the currently assumed force could get to the theater rapidly and thus provide a credible deterrent (depending on the depth of the intent of the aggressor), it had inadequate armor to deal with the anticipated threat, an inappropriate covering force, and a lack of a counteroffensive capability required to restore any territory lost. Third Army also believed the motorized brigade provided was an inadequate theater reserve.[26]

While Internal Look took place, General Yeosock had his staff prepare alternative force lists. Option 1 called for a force of ten heavy brigades (three and one-third divisions). It eliminated the airborne and air assault divisions and the separate brigades and portrayed a force of an armored cavalry regiment, three heavy divisions (two mechanized and one armored), and included reserve component roundout brigades. The helicopter brigade task force, now the 6th Cavalry (Air Combat) Brigade, and the air defense brigade were the only Army units in the C+12 force. Such a force would double the armor capability. It would provide an armored cavalry regiment for the covering force and a counteroffensive capability. But it would not allow for rapid deployment and thus would not, by itself, form a strong deterrent in the early days of any crisis.[27]

A second alternative retained the air assault division as a C+12 force, along with the air defense brigade, to accomplish the deterrence mission. This called for a C+50 force of an armored cavalry regiment, two mechanized divisions, and one armored division—that is, ten heavy and three light brigades. This was the favored option, although it was recognized that sealift would be exceeded at C+40.[28] In addition, the Third Army commander used Internal Look to argue for the addition of more Patriot missile units.[29] All options required additional fast sealift to accommodate the heavier forces.[30] For Schwarzkopf, who was faced with a fixed resource in strategic transport, any increase in the Army's requirements would have to be met by a reduction in some other force's arrival time or a longer period of deployment. In the early hours of a crisis, the premium on the combat potential of tactical air forces would militate against any shift in priorities. Third Army briefers took the results of this exercise to

the Department of the Army and briefed the plan only hours before Iraq invaded Kuwait.[31]

All this effort was not so much evidence of prescience as it was of professional military planners doing their job. It is the business of planning headquarters to anticipate possible threats to national security within their areas of responsibility and to plan to deal with them. Iraq was the greatest potential threat in the region once the Soviets were eliminated as a possible attacker. U.S. interests were genuine and of long standing. It can be argued that the threat of Iraq was always present and had just been countenanced because of the overriding global nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and residual U.S. hostility with Iran.

For six months prior to commitment, the Third Army and XVIII Airborne Corps staffs had thought through the problems involved in the operation they were about to undertake. As a consequence, the Third Army commander had succeeded in convincing the chief of Central Command and the Department of the Army of the requirement for heavier, more lethal, forces and the need to employ the Patriot missile as a theater antitactical ballistic missile system. These decisions were to be justified in the following weeks and months. The studies also pointed out, as the deployment itself would confirm, that available strategic sealift was a significant weakness in the security of the United States' vital interests in the Persian Gulf area.

Notes

1. United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 678, 29 November 1990. The resolution demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 and authorized the use of all necessary means by UN members to bring about Iraqi withdrawal thereafter. The Security Council vote was twelve for, two against (Yemen and Cuba). China abstained. "UN Resolutions," *Military Review* 71 (September 1991): 79. The text of the resolution is in "Text of U.N. Resolution on Using Force in the Gulf," *The New York Times*, 30 November 1990, A10; and "Resolution Sets Jan. 15 Deadline For Withdrawal," The *Washington Post*, 30 November 1990, A23.

2. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991, 1.

3. HQ, Forces Command, FCJ5-PP, Memorandum for Commander, ARCENT Rear, AFRD-XO (Colonel Edwards), Subject: ARCENT Organization and Functions to Support Operation Desert Shield, dated 8 November 1990. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing C+61, given to Chief of Staff, Army, on 7 October, slide titled, "Force Rotation Tour Considerations." This briefing is scripted, which makes it particularly useful as a status report.

4. "Congressional Resolution," *Military Review*, 91–92. The resolution was passed on 12 January by a vote of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House.

5. Baker testimony in, United States Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, 4 and 5 December 1990, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (S. Hrg. 101-1128, Pr. 1), 140. Speaking to Senator Dodd, Secretary Baker said: "But Senator, surely you are not suggesting that we go over there [Iraq] and negotiate something short of the U.N. resolutions?"

6. See the comments in Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, USMC, Retired, "Desert Shield: From the Gulf," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 117, no. 1 (January 1991): 77–80.

7. U.S. Army, *Center of Military History*, Draft Chronology: Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 2. (Attributed to Iraq-Kuwait Chronology, by AP [1990].)

8. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991, 2. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group, Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June 1991, 1–6. This memorandum was prepared by Major Steve Holley, the planning officer most involved with 1002-90, and signed by Colonel Harold E. Holloway, ARCENT chief of plans. It is the most comprehensive document available on the pre-August planning process. General Schwarzkopf fixes his decision to shift the focus on CENTCOM planning in July 1989, noting it was a decision that had evolved over a period of time. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992), 273–87 (hereafter referred to as Schwarzkopf, *Doesn't Take a Hero*).

9. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group, Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June 1991, 4.

10. "Statement of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command," in United States Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, 12 December 1989; 23, 24, 25, 26, 30 January; 2, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22 February; 7 March 1990 (S. Hrg. 101-70), 608, 626.

11. U.S. Army, Center of Military History, "Interview with General G. Sullivan, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, 4 February 1991," 25. Major Steven Holley, the ARCENT planner for OPLAN 1001-90, told the author that the same point was raised by Department of State planners during the planning process at CENTCOM.

12. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group, Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June 1991, 3.

13. Ibid., 1. See also HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Command Briefing; Preliminary Phase (Internal Look '90).

14. U.S. Army, Concepts and Analysis Agency, Wargame Persian Tiger 89, Study Report CAA-SR-90-5, August 1990.

15. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group, Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June 1991, 3.

16. Major General William Riley, "New Realities Briefing."

17. HQ, ARCENT, COMUSARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft), 16 July 1990, 4.

18. Ibid., 5.

19. Ibid., 27–28.

20. Ibid., 20–21.

21. Ibid., 30–34.

22. Ibid., 34.

23. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group, Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June 1991, 3. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991.

24. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Command Briefing: Preliminary Phase (Internal Look '90). HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.

25. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. Base Case. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.

26. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.

27. Ibid., Option 1.

28. Ibid., Option 2.

29. HQ, 11th ADA Brigade, briefing titled, "Initial Patriot Battalion Incremental ATBM Capability," Internal Look '90, undated. HQ, 11th ADA Brigade, briefing titled, "Initial Assessment of USCINCCENT Patriot Requirement," Internal Look '90, dated July 1990. See also the remarks of General Charles Horner, USAF, "Offensive Air Operations: Lessons for the Future," *RUSI Journal* 138, No. 6 (December 1993): 22.

30. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "ARCENT Update," presented to the 1990 Army Leadership Seminar on 6 August 1990. The latter briefing showed the preferred force would take seventy-five deployment days vice fifty-five for base case. The requirement for either was fifty days. The ARCENT conclusion—"Need 6 more fast sealift ships."

31. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Operations," presented to the vice chief of staff and Army Staff on 1 August 1990.